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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the artificial noise-
aided jamming design for a transmitter equipped with large
antenna array in Rician fading channels. We figure out that
when the number of transmit antennas tends to infinity, whether
the secrecy outage happens in a Rician channel depends on
the geometric locations of eavesdroppers. In this light, we first
define and analytically describe the secrecy outage region (SOR),
indicating all possible locations of an eavesdropper that can cause
secrecy outage. After that, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) is
derived, and a jamming-beneficial range, i.e., the distance range
of eavesdroppers which enables uniform jamming to reduce the
SOP, is determined. Then, the optimal power allocation between
messages and artificial noise is investigated for different scenarios.
Furthermore, to use the jamming power more efficiently and
further reduce the SOP, we propose directional jamming that
generates jamming signals at selected beams (mapped to physical
angles) only, and power allocation algorithms are proposed for
the cases with and without the information of the suspicious area,
i.e., possible locations of eavesdroppers. We further extend the
discussions to multiuser and multi-cell scenarios. At last, numer-
ical results validate our conclusions and show the effectiveness
of our proposed jamming power allocation schemes.
Index Terms—Jamming, massive MIMO, outage, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems,
where an enormous number of antennas are deployed at the
base station, have become a hot research area in recent years
[1], [2]. As the number of antennas goes to infinity, the
effect of uncorrelated interferences and noises can tend to zero
asymptotically by using only simple linear transmit/receive
techniques [3], leading to intensive growth in spectrum and
power efficiency [4]. When used for beamforming, massive
MIMO leads to sharp beam patterns as well as low power
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leakage to unintended directions [5]. Due to these attractive
properties, massive MIMO becomes a promising technique
for future communication systems such as the fifth generation
cellular system [6]. In the meanwhile, it can be anticipated that
massive MIMO will also become crucial in security related
applications.
Secure communication in wiretap channels has been stud-
ied for decades since the seminal work [7]. Corresponding
studies have been further extended to different type of wiretap
channels [8], [9], fading channels [10], [11], MIMO channels
[12]–[15], and networks [16], [17]. The research topics span
a wide range from information-theoretical contributions such
as secrecy capacity analysis and rate region characterization
to practical transmission design issues including precoding,
user scheduling, and artificial noise (AN)-aided jamming. For
a complete review of the most lately approaches, see [18],
[19]. Regarding the communication secrecy, the emergence of
the massive MIMO technique brings new opportunities and
challenges. Recently, physical layer security techniques using
massive MIMO have drawn increasing attentions in the litera-
ture. In [20]–[23], the secrecy rate in massive MIMO systems
has been analyzed using large system analysis and secure
precoding schemes were designed. In [24], [25], it has been
shown that massive MIMO can benefit the detection of active
eavesdropper who performs attacking on the channel training
phase [26]. Note that the above-mentioned approaches require
either the channel state information (CSI) of eavesdroppers
can be known, or their existence can be detected. For the
scenarios that eavesdroppers are completely passive and their
CSI is unknown, AN-aided jamming [27] can be a feasible
solution. Only recently, the AN-aided jamming approach has
been applied for massive MIMO systems in [28], [29] and was
shown to be beneficial for communication secrecy.
In this paper, we study the secure communication in massive
MIMO systems via AN-aided jamming. Differently from [28],
we consider the scenario that eavesdroppers are randomly
located around a legitimate transmitter equipped with large
antenna array, and all channels follow Rician distribution. In
this case, the geometric locations (described by both the angle
of arrival and distance to the transmitter) of the legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers become essential in the secrecy
outage analysis, which highlights the main difference between
our work and [28]. The motivation of our paper is based on
the following considerations: 1) Since the beam towards the
legitimate receiver becomes sharper and the power leakage to
other directions becomes trivial in massive MIMO systems,
it is doubtful whether jamming is still beneficial for secrecy,
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and 2) as the number of antennas grows, the dimension of the
jamming space increases and jamming power needs to spread
over a large number of directions, which makes conventional
uniform jamming inefficient with massive MIMO. Regarding
these issues, two questions are raised:
1) Does conventional uniform jamming still benefit the
secure communication in massive MIMO systems when
Nt goes to infinity?
2) Is there more efficient scheme rather than uniform
jamming in the massive MIMO setup?
In this paper, we will answer these two questions by making
the following contributions:
• For the massive MIMO Rician fading channels, we
analytically describe the secrecy outage region (SOR)
as geometric locations of eavesdroppers that can induce
secrecy outage. The concept of SOR further has been used
to characterize the secrecy outage probability (SOP).
• With the information of the suspicious area where eaves-
droppers are possibly located, we derive analytical ex-
pression of the SOP in the presence of one legitimate
receiver and multiple passive eavesdroppers. After that,
it is proved that conventional uniform jamming is still
useful in terms of reducing the SOP when any eaves-
droppers are located within a certain distance range to
Alice, which we call it as the jamming-beneficial range.
This conclusion provides an answer to the first question.
• For uniform jamming, the optimal signal and jamming
power allocation is investigated for different scenarios.
We further devise practical directional jamming algo-
rithms, either with or without the information of the sus-
picious area. The proposed directional jamming schemes
use the jamming power more efficiently to further and
substantially reduce the SOP, which provides answers to
the second raised question.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides system model. Section III describes the SOR, further
provides an analytical expression of SOP and a jamming-
beneficial range. Optimal jamming power allocation is stud-
ied for uniform jamming in Section IV, and in Section V,
directional jamming algorithms are proposed. In Section VI,
the SOR is discussed for multiuser and multi-cell scenarios.
Section VII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the network model. As an
important concept in subsequent analysis, we further define the
normalized crosstalk between two wireless links and introduce
its characteristics. Then, the AN-aided secure transmission and
the definition of SOP are described.
A. Network Model
We consider the network shown in Fig. 1, where a transmit-
ter (Alice) equipped with Nt antennas transmits to a single-
antenna user (Bob) in the existence of L external passive
single-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves 1, ..., L). Alice uses beam-
forming for the data transmission to Bob, while jamming
Fig. 1: Description of the network layout.
with AN in other spaces (or directions). We define the set
of receivers Ir = {b, e1, ..., eL} where b denotes Bob and el
(l = 1, ..., L) denotes Eve l. Considering Rician fading, the
channel between Alice and receiver i is given by
hi =
√
Ki
1 +Ki
h¯i +
√
1
1 +Ki
gi, ∀i ∈ Ir (1)
where Ki is the Rician K-factor, gi ∈ CNt×1 is the i.i.d.
fast fading part whose elements follow CN (0, 1) distribution
(complex normal distribution with zero mean and unit vari-
ance). For uniform linear array with inter-antenna spacing d0
(in wavelength), the line of sight (LOS) component h¯i can be
written as the steering vector at incident angle θi:
h¯i = s¯(θi) =
(
1, e−j2pid0 sin θi , ..., e−j2pi(Nt−1)d0 sin θi
)T
(2)
where θi is the LOS angle of receiver i. In addition, we
consider large scale fading d−αi where di is the distance from
Alice to receiver i, and α is the path loss coefficient.
We consider a practical scenario that Eves are uniformly
distributed within an angular range Ae , [θmin, θmax] and a
distance range De , [Dmin(θe),Dmax(θe)], where Dmin(θe)
and Dmax(θe) are functions of θe ∈ Ae, defining two borders
of this area. Throughout this paper, we use
Rsus , {(θe, de) | θe ∈ Ae, de ∈ De} (3)
to define the suspicious area. In practice, if Alice has only lim-
ited information of Dmin(θe) and Dmax(θe), she can assume
the two boundaries are defined by constant values, dmin and
dmax. For instance, if Alice knows nothing aboutRsus, she can
set Ae = [0, 2pi], De = [0, rmax], indicating that the suspicious
area (from Alice’s point of view) spans the entire space with
radius rmax. The effectiveness of this assumption, referred to
as “constant boundaries” and defined below, depends on that
how accurately it can describe the real Rsus.
Definition 1 (Constant Boundaries): To facilitate practical
design, it is convenient to set the two boundaries of Rsus
to be constants such that Dmin(θe) = dmin, Dmax(θe) =
dmax, ∀θe ∈ Ae.
3Fsi;j (x) =


1− F∆
(
CP0(
x
Ki;j
)
)
, PV1 ≤
x
Ki;j
≤ 1
1− F∆
(
CP0(
x
Ki;j
)
)
+
M∑
m=1
(
F∆
(
CPm,1(
x
Ki;j
)
)
− F∆
(
CPm,2(
x
Ki;j
)
))
, PVM+1 ≤
x
Ki;j
< PVM
(7)
B. Normalized Crosstalk
For hi, hj (j ∈ Ir) defined as (1), the following asymptotic
results hold as Nt →∞ [30]:
1
Nt
hHi hi
.
= 1 (4)
1
Nt
hHi hj
.
=
1
Nt
√
Ki;jti;j , j 6= i. (5)
where .= denotes the approximation that is asymptot-
ically accurate,1 Ki;j , KiKj(1+Ki)(1+Kj) , and ti;j ,∑Nt−1
n=0 e
−j2pid0(sin θi−sin θj)n
. Stemming from (5), we intro-
duce the following definition.
Definition 2 (Normalized Crosstalk): Define the normal-
ized crosstalk between nodes i, j as
si;j(θi, θj) ,
∣∣∣∣ 1NthHi hj
∣∣∣∣
2
.
=
1
N2t
Ki;j |ti;j |
2. (6)
Lemma 1: The normalized crosstalk si;j(θi, θj) has the
following characteristics:
1) si;j(θi, θj) is a sinc-like function composed of one main
lobe and multiple side lobes.
2) With fixed θj and random θi ∼ U(θmin, θmax) which is
uniformly distributed between θmin and θmax, the CDF
of si;j(θi, θj) can be written as (7) (see top of this page)
where the definitions of CP0, CPm,1, CPm,2 and F∆(·)
are referred to Appendix A.
3) With fixed θj , the feasible range of si;j(θi, θj) is 0 ≤
si;j ≤ smaxi;j , where smaxi;j ≤ Ki;j is determined by the
distribution range of θi, i.e., Ai , [θmin, θmax].
Proof: See Appendix A.
C. Secrecy Transmission Scheme
We use linear precoding for data transmission, while AN
symbols sn are sent in the space defined by vn, n = 1, ..., N ,
to degrade the channels of Eves. For the null space-based
jamming [27], it holds that N = Nt − 1 and vn ∈ null(hb).
The received signal at receiver i is given by
yi =
√
Pbd
−α
i h
H
i wbxb+
N∑
n=1
√
P¯nd
−α
i h
H
i vnsn+ni, ∀i ∈ R
(8)
where wb ∈ CNt×1 is the precoder for Bob, xb is the unit-
norm data symbol, and ni is the additive Gaussian noise.
Moreover, Pb and P¯n respectively are the powers allocated
to Bob and the n-th jamming direction, with total power
constraint such as
∑N
n=1 P¯n = Ptot − Pb where Ptot is the
total available transmit power. We define the jamming power
1In this paper, we focus on the large antenna regime, and will use equalities
instead of approximations for brevity.
allocation coefficient as
φ ,
Pjam
Ptot
=
∑N
n=1 P¯n
Ptot
. (9)
For ease of description, we assume that Bob and all Eves
share the same noise covariance being N0. Moreover, we
consider maximum ratio transmission (MRT) for precoding of
the data symbol xb, i.e., wb = hb||hb|| . In this case, according
to (8), the SINR at receiver i is given by
SINRi =
Pbd
−α
i |h
H
i wb|
2
N0 + d
−α
i
∑N
n=1 P¯n|h
H
i vn|
2
. (10)
We assume that the Eves are not colluding, but consider the
most-capable Eve, which has the maximum receive SINR, to
define the secrecy rate as [22]
Rsb = [log2(1 + SINRb)− log2(1 + SINRe,max)]
+ (11)
where SINRe,max , max
l
SINRel and [x]+ , max{x, 0}. We
say a secrecy outage occurs if Rsb is less than a target rate
Rth, hence the SOP is defined as
Pout = Pr{R
s
b < Rth}. (12)
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first introduce the secrecy outage region
(SOR) which describes all possible locations of Eves who can
cause secrecy outage. Analytical expression of the SOR is
derived for uniform jamming, then the SOP is studied with
variant shapes of Rsus. At last, a jamming-beneficial range
is derived to show that uniform jamming is still useful in
reducing the SOP.
A. Secrecy Outage Region
In the large antenna regime, all fast fading effects are
completely averaged out as shown in (4) and (5). Therefore,
whether the secrecy outage occurs or not, will be essentially
determined by the geometric location of Eve. In this light, we
introduce the SOR defined in the following.
Definition 3 (Secrecy Outage Region): The SOR is defined
in terms of polar coordinates as
RSOR ,
{
(θe, de) | lim
Nt→∞
Rsb < Rth
}
. (13)
Herein, we note that Rsb is a function of θe and de.
In the large antenna regime, secrecy outage occurs if there
exists at least one Eve within the SOR. If all Eves locate
outside of the SOR, the target secrecy rate Rth can be
guaranteed. To characterize the SOR, we first evaluate the
received SINRs assuming uniform jamming.
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C3(φ) =
C2(φ)
C1(φ)
=
(
1 + (1− φ)P˜totd
−α
b Nt − 2
Rth
)
P˜totφ(
1 + (1− φ)P˜totd
−α
b Nt − 2
Rth
)
P˜totφ+ (1 − φ)P˜totNt2Rth
. (22)
Lemma 2: With uniform jamming in null(hb), the SINRs
at Bob and any Eve can be, respectively, written as2
SINRujb = P˜bd
−α
b Nt (14)
SINRuje =
P˜bd
−α
e Ntse;b(θe)
1 + d−αe P˜jam(1− se;b(θe))
(15)
where, and hereafter, we use the notations P˜b = PbN0 , P˜jam =
Pjam
N0
for brevity. Note that in (15), se;b(θe) is the normalized
crosstalk between Eve and Bob as defined in (6). Considering
fixed θb, we hereafter write se;b as a function of only θe.
Proof: Since span(vn) = null(hb), jamming causes no
interference at Bob. Applying (4) to (10), we get (14). Noting
that N = Nt − 1 and P¯n = PjamNt−1 , from (10), we have
SINRuje =
Pbd
−α
e |h
H
e wb|
2
N0 + d
−α
e
Pjam
Nt−1
Nt−1∑
n=1
|hHe wn|
2
. (16)
By applying (6), the numerator of (16) can be written
as Pbd
−α
e Ntse;b(θe). On the other hand, noting that wb
and vn, n = 1, ..., Nt − 1 constitute a complete orthog-
onal basis of the Nt-dimensional vector space, we have∑Nt−1
n=1 |hewn|
2= ||he||2 − |hewb|2 = Nt(1−se;b(θe)) in the
denominator of (16). Therefore, (15) can be obtained.
Remark 1: The result in (14) leads to a constraint on φ
(defined in (9)), written as
φ ≤ φmax = 1−
2Rth − 1
P˜totd
−α
b Nt
(17)
which stems from the fact that the jamming power cannot be
too large, otherwise, even without Eves, the target rate Rth
cannot be guaranteed since the remained signaling power is
too small. Unless otherwise specified, we assume (17) can
always hold via proper power allocation.
From Lemma 2, we characterize the SOR for the uniform
jamming as follows.
Proposition 1: With uniform jamming in null(hb) and
given φ, the SOR is described as
RujSOR(φ) =
{
(θe, de) | de < d¯
uj
e (φ, θe), se;b (θe) > C3(φ)
}
(18)
where
d¯uje (φ, θe) = (C1(φ)se;b (θe)− C2(φ))
1
α (19)
C1(φ) =
(1− φ)P˜totNt2Rth
1 + (1 − φ)P˜totd
−α
b Nt − 2
Rth
+ P˜totφ, (20)
C2(φ) = P˜totφ (21)
and C3(φ) is given by (22) shown at the top of this page.
2Hereafter, if one notation is applied for any Eve, we will use the subscript
e instead of el for the sake of brevity.
Proof: Substituting (14) and (15) into (11) and using the
definition of SOR in (13), we can obtain the value of d¯uje (φ, θe)
in (19). Note that the value of d¯uje (φ, θe) should be positive,
this straightforwardly introduces the constraint on the mini-
mum value of se;b(θe) such as se;b (θe) > C3(φ) where C3(φ)
can be readily obtained by letting C1(φ)se;b(θe)−C2(φ) > 0.
From Lemma 1, se;b(θe) in (19) is a function with one main
lobe and multiple side lobes, resulting in a multi-lobe shaped
SOR. In order to gain some insights from this complex shape
(as will be shown in the simulations), we focus on several
critical security-related metrics as
• Largest radius of the main lobe (d¯uje,0) and the m-th side
lobe (d¯uje,m): d¯uje,0 and d¯uje,m can be obtained by replacing
se;b(θe) in (19) respectively with Ke;b and Ke;bPVm
(defined as (54) in the proof of Lemma 1), such that
d¯uje,0 , (C1(φ)Ke;b − C2(φ))
1
α (23)
d¯uje,m , (C1(φ)Ke;bPVm − C2(φ))
1
α . (24)
Since d¯uje,0 is much larger than d¯uje,m, ∀m 6= 0, d¯
uj
e,0 can be
considered as the largest distance of the SOR. For any
Eve whose distance to Alice is larger than d¯uje,0, we can
conclude that it causes no secrecy outage regardless of
its LOS direction.
• Largest angle difference ∆θmax of the SOR: For any
Eve whose angle difference to the LOS direction of Bob
is larger than ∆θmax, we can conclude that it causes
no secrecy outage regardless of its distance to Alice. If
se;b(θe) < C3(φ), ∀θe > θˆe, we can write
∆θmax =
∣∣∣θˆe − θb∣∣∣ . (25)
Clearly, to have smaller SOR, we expect to reduce both d¯uje,0
and ∆θmax. To minimize d¯uje,0 in (23), we need to minimize
C1(φ) while maximizing C2(φ); however, since C3(φ) =
C2(φ)
C1(φ)
, this results in a maximized C3(φ) (correspondingly,
a larger ∆θmax), which is not desired. It is clear that a trade-
off in φ exists in balancing the effects of both d¯uje,0 and
∆θmax, which can be formulated as jamming power allocation
problems, as described in the following sections.
At last, by setting φ = 0 in Proposition 1, we obtain the
following corollary:
Corollary 1: Without jamming, i.e., φ = 0, the SOR can
be found as
RnjSOR =

(θe, de) | de <
(
P˜totNt2
Rthse;b (θe)
1 + P˜totd
−α
b Nt − 2
Rth
) 1
α


(26)
where the superscript (·)nj stands for “no jamming”.
Proof: The corollary is directly obtained by setting φ = 0
in Proposition 1.
5Differently from (18), the constraint on se;b(θe) vanishes in
(26), indicating that the SOR now is extended to the entire
angular domain. Moreover, compared with (23), we see that
d¯e,0 in no-jamming case,3 on the contrary, is reduced compared
to uniform jamming. In conclusion, uniform jamming induces
two opposite effects: the beneficial one is that the SOR can
be squeezed in angular domain, and the disadvantage is that
the SOR is enlarged in Bob’s direction, i.e., the main lobe.
Illustration of the SOR changing caused by jamming will be
shown later in simulations.
B. SOP Analysis
With a single Eve uniformly distributed in Rsus, using the
derived SOR, the SOP is given by
Pout,singleEve =
Area (RSOR(φ) ∩Rsus)
Area (Rsus)
(27)
where Area(·) denotes the area of a certain geometric region.
Considering that there are L Eves uniformly distributed in
Rsus, the SOP of the entire network can be written as
Pout = 1− (1− Pout,singleEve)
L
. (28)
From (27), the SOP is determined by the overlapping area
between two geometrical regions. If RSOR(φ)∩Rsus = ∅, zero
SOP is achieved. Recalling (3), as well as (23) and (25), two
sufficient conditions of RSOR(φ) ∩ Rsus = ∅ can be written
as
Dmin(θe) > d¯e,0, ∀θe,
or Dmax(θe) = 0, ∀ |θe − θb| < ∆θmax (29)
where d¯e,0 is defined in (23) and ∆θmax is in (25). The
physical insight of (29) is clear: when an Eve is far away
or its angle difference to θb is large, it does not cause outage.
For the general case with arbitrary shape of Rsus, Pout
in (27) can be numerically evaluated and further applied to
jamming power allocation design. However, due to the non-
regular shapes of RSOR(φ) and Rsus, closed-form expressions
of Area (RSOR(φ) ∩Rsus) as well as the SOP in (28) do
not exist for the general case. Yet, by considering constant
boundaries of Rsus as described in Definition 1, (27) can be
written in an integral form as the following proposition.
Proposition 2: With constant boundaries of Rsus, i.e.,
Ae = [θmin, θmax] and De = [dmin, dmax], and uniform
jamming in null(hb), the SOP can be given as
Pout = 1−
{∫ dmax
dmin
Fse;b

 zα + P˜jam
P˜bNt2Rth
1+P˜bd
−α
b
Nt−2Rth
+ P˜jam


×
2z
d2max − d
2
min
dz
}L
. (30)
where Fse;b(·) is defined in (7).
Proof: For the ease of analytical description, herein we
utilize the CDF of the normalized crosstalk in (7). First, rewrite
3Hereafter, for the conditions where the corresponding notation can be
applied for either the uniform-jamming or no-jamming cases, we ignore the
superscript “uj” or “nj” for brevity.
(12) as Pout = 1− Pr{Rsb ≥ Rth} and recall (11), we have
Pr{Rsb ≥ Rth} = FSINRuje,max
(
1 + SINRujb
2Rth
− 1
)
(31)
where FSINRuje,max(·) is the CDF of SINR
uj
e,max, which is
given by FSINRuje,max(x) =
(
FSINRuje (x)
)L
since all Eves are
independently distributed. Using (15), we have
FSINRuje (x) = Pr
{
se;b(θe) ≤
dαe + P˜jam
P˜bNt
x
+ P˜jam
}
(32)
where both θe and de are random. Since θe and de are
independent, (32) can be presented as
FSINRe(x) =
∫ dmax
dmin
Fse;b
(
zα + P˜jam
P˜bNt
x
+ P˜jam
)
fde(z)dz. (33)
where fde(z) , 2zd2max−d2min is the PDF of de, corresponding to
the uniform distribution between two boundaries defined by
De = [dmin, dmax]. Then, Pout is directly obtained as (30).
Practically, (30) can be used for jamming power alloca-
tion. As stated in Remark 1, Alice can arbitrarily adjust the
value of the constant boundaries in the design, based on the
information about Rsus that she has. Particularly, if Alice
knows nothing about Rsus (i.e., she assumes Ae = [0, 2pi]
and De = [0, rmax]), minimizing Pout becomes equivalent to
minimizing Area (RSOR(φ)).
C. Jamming-beneficial Range
Based on Proposition 2, we find a jamming-beneficial range
defined in dmax (i.e., the larger constant distance boundary of
Rsus) as follows.
Proposition 3: A constraint on dmax that makes the uniform
jamming beneficial in reducing the SOP is given by
dmax <
(
smaxe;b
P˜totNt2
Rth
1 + P˜totd
−α
b Nt − 2
Rth
) 1
α
(34)
where smaxe;b is the largest feasible crosstalk value defined in
Lemma 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2: Proposition 3 shows that when Eves are located
close enough to Alice, uniform jamming is always beneficial
in reducing the SOP. Clearly, this range expands with larger
db, as well as larger smaxe;b or larger Rth. On the other hand,
the range shrinks with larger Nt or P˜tot.
Moreover, we note that (34) has a similar form of that
described for the SOR without jamming, i.e., RnjSOR in (26).
Recalling the definitions of the largest distance of SOR in (23)
and (24), the physical insight of Proposition 3 can be explained
as follows: as long as Rsus ∩ RnjSOR 6= ∅, there always
exists an optimal φ, with which the SOP can be reduced by
uniform jamming, compared with the SOP without jamming.
The optimization of φ is discussed in the next section.
IV. JAMMING POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, considering uniform jamming, we investigate
the optimal jamming power allocation that minimizes the SOP.
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The problem can be simply described as
min
φ
Pout, s.t. 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. (35)
In practice, Alice may have different accuracy levels of
information about Rsus as follows:
1) Alice knows nothing about the suspicious area, or only
partial information about the suspicious area such as Ae
only (or De only); and
2) Alice knows exact information about the suspicious area,
i.e., both Ae and De.
For these two cases, we respectively investigate the jamming
power allocation in the following.
A. Jamming with None/Partial Information about Rsus
When Alice knows nothing aboutRsus, minimizing the SOP
becomes equivalent to minimizing the area of SOR, which can
be calculated as
Area
(
RujSOR(φ)
)
=
∫ 2pi
0
1
2
(
d¯uje (φ, θe)
)2
dθe (36)
where d¯uje (φ, θe) is defined in (19). Note that RujSOR(φ) is
composed of many side lobes. We use RujSOR,m(φ) to denote
the m-th side lobe, and RujSOR,I(φ) to denote a group of
side lobes with indices described by the set I. For the case
that Alice knows Ae or De, we can simplify the problem by
minimizing partial, other than the entire area of RujSOR(φ) such
as
Area
(
RujSOR,I′(φ)
)
=
∑
m∈I′
Area
(
RujSOR,m(φ)
)
(37)
where I ′ is the set of the concerned side lobe indices,
determined by either Ae or De. Using (36) (or (37)) along
with (19), the areas can be numerically calculated and the
optimal φ can be easily founded via one dimensional linear
search. Since it is difficult to derive closed-form expression
for Area
(
RujSOR,I(φ)
)
, we evaluate the area of RujSOR,m(φ)
in the following corollary for a special case to further provide
some discussions.
Corollary 2 (Area of RujSOR,m(φ)): With θb = 0 and the
path loss coefficient being α = 2 (which corresponds the
free space propagation [32]), Area
(
RujSOR,m
)
can be upper
bounded as
Area
(
RujSOR,m(φ)
)
≤
1
4Ntd
(
Ke;b
pi2m2
C1(φ)− 2C2(φ)
)
(38)
where C1(φ) and C2(φ) are defined in (20) and (21).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 3: In (38), it is shown that the area of every side
lobe is inversely proportional to Nt, indicating that the SOR
side lobes can asymptotically vanish with ultimately large Nt.
Moreover, it is inversely proportional to m2, which means
that the area of the SOR will rapidly decrease for the side
lobes with large indices, i.e., with large angle difference to
θb. This result indicates that Eves from different directions
(i.e., within different side lobes) have different significance in
causing secrecy outage, hence should be treated differently in
the jamming design.
B. Jamming with Exact Information of Rsus
With the information of Rsus, Alice can calculate and apply
the value of Pout in the design (at least numerically),4 using
either (28) or (30). Although in practice, (35) can be readily
solved by one dimensional linear search, it fails to provide
the optimal φ in closed form. In the following corollary, we
provide closed-form solutions and discussions for a special
case.
Corollary 3 (Jamming power allocation for given θe): For
constant boundaries of Rsus and given θe, which is equal for
all Eves, the optimal φ can be determined as
φopt =
{
φoptg , φ0 /∈ [0, 1]
min{φoptg , φ0} φ0 ∈ [0, 1]
(39)
where
φoptg = 1−
(2Rth − 1) +
√
(2Rth−1)2Rthse;b(θe)
1−se;b(θe)
Nt
d−αb NtP˜tot
, (40)
φ0 =
P˜totNt2
Rthse;b(θe)
1+P˜totd
−α
b
Nt−2Rth
− dαmin
(1− se;b(θe))P˜tot
. (41)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note when φopt = φoptg , the optimal jamming power
decreases with db and se;b(θe), whereas it will increase when
φopt = φ0. The part that dominates the final result in (39)
depends on the value of θe. Detailed discussions will be
provided in Section VII along with simulations.
V. DIRECTIONAL JAMMING
In this section, we propose directional jamming algorithms
to allocate jamming power more efficiently than uniform
jamming, based on the following facts:
1) With the information of Rsus, Alice can perform jam-
ming only to the suspicious directions instead of the
entire null space of hb.
2) Without information of Rsus, jamming towards different
directions also needs to be treated differently, as stated
in Remark 3.
At a cost of slightly increasing the implementation complexity
compared with uniform jamming, directional jamming is able
to substantially reduce the SOP. In following subsections, we
present power allocation algorithms for directional jamming
with and without the information of Rsus.
A. Directional Jamming with the Information of Rsus
When jamming is not uniformly performed, from (10), the
SINR at Eve is represented as
SINRdje =
Pbd
−α
e |h
H
e wb|
2
N0 + d
−α
e hHe Vdiag (p¯)V
Hhe
(42)
4The calculation requires the knowledge of De and Ae. Clearly, uniform
jamming is not optimal in this condition. However, for the ease of analysis,
we first devise the optimal power allocation for uniform jamming; then, the
resulted jamming power can be allocated directionally to further improve
efficiency.
7Algorithm 1 Directional jamming with the information of
Rsus
1: Initialization: Update the information of θb, db and Rsus
at Alice.
2: Assuming null space-based uniform jamming, find
φopt = argmin
φ
Pout
through one dimensional linear search over φ ∈ [0, 1).
3: Select a N -dimensional subspace (vn, n = 1, ..., N and
N ≤ Nt) from null{hb} according to (46), where θvn is
defined as (45).
4: Equally allocate P optjam = φoptPtot to the selected beams
in step 3 such as P
opt
jam
N
.
whereV ∈ CNt×N is the matrix that spans the jamming space,
with the n-th column vector being vn, and p¯ =
(
P¯1, ..., P¯N
)T
,
where P¯n is the power allocated to the n-th jamming direction
as defined in (8). Correspondingly, the SOR now can be
described as
RdjSOR(p¯) =
{
(de, θe) | de ≤ d¯
dj
e (p¯, θe)
} (43)
d¯dje (p¯, θe) =
[(
2Rth(1− φ)P˜totNtse;b(θe)
1 + (1− φ)P˜totd
−α
b Nt − 2
Rth
− s¯(θe)
HVdiag(p˜)VH s¯(θe)
) 1
α
]+
(44)
where p˜ , p¯
N0
, s¯(·) was defined in (2). The superscript (·)dj
stands for “directional jamming”.
Design directional jamming using (42) induces high com-
plexity especially when N is large, since changing any ele-
ment in the N -dimensional vector p¯ requires re-calculation
of RdjSOR(p¯). Hence, we alternatively propose a two-step
suboptimal power allocation method for directional jamming
in Algorithm 1, which firstly find the optimal jamming power
assuming uniform jamming, then reallocate it directionally
based on a criterion of jamming subspace selection. In Step
2, Pout can be calculated numerically using (28) or (30),
depending on the available information of Rsus. Note that
θb, db and Rsus are long term parameters, thus the updating
period of Step 1 can be much longer than the computation
time required by the other steps.
Since Rsus is defined by physical angles, it is necessary to
set up a mapping between the jamming space and physical
angle to concentrate the jamming power towards Rsus. We
propose a heuristic subspace selection method for Step 3. First,
map vn to physical angle as
θvn = arg max
θ∈[−pi
2
,pi
2
]
∣∣s¯(θ)Tvn∣∣2 . (45)
After that, P optjam is equally reallocated to the beams whose
indices are
N , {n | θvn ∈ Ae}. (46)
The power allocated to each beam is now P
opt
jam
dim(N ) . In practice,
vn is not necessarily in null(hb) and an alternative is to find
Algorithm 2 Iterative directional jamming without informa-
tion of Rsus
1: Initialization: Update the information of θb and db at
Alice; set an initial jamming power allocation vector p¯0,
satisfying ||p¯0|| ≤ Ptotφmax; set the initial iteration index
j = 1.
2: for n = 1 to N do
3: Update
p¯j(n) = argmin
x∈[0,xmax)
Area
(
RdjSOR
(
[p¯j(1), ...,
p¯j(n− 1), x, p¯j−1(n+ 1), ..., p¯j−1(N)]
))
where xmax = Ptotφmax −
n−1∑
i=1
p¯j(i)−
N∑
i=n+1
p¯j−1(i).
4: end for
5: if ||p¯j − p¯j−1|| ≥ ε then
6: j = j + 1; go to step 2.
7: else if ||p¯j − p¯j−1|| < ε then
8: return
9: end if
vn as the column vectors of a Nt-dimensional DFT matrix for
the following reasons; 1) selected columns of the DFT matrix
can form a good substitute of null(hb), as Nt → ∞ [33];
2) using pre-defined DFT basis as the jamming space avoids
channel inverse calculation, which induces high computation
complexity especially when Nt is large [28]; and 3) most
importantly, the structure of DFT matrix provides very sharp
beam pattern towards the physical angle θvn in (45), therefore,
the beam selection criterion (46) can be very efficient since
with sharper beams, there will be less jamming power leaked
outside of Rsus.
B. Directional Jamming without Information of Rsus
Without any information of Rsus, the objective of direc-
tional jamming power allocation becomes to minimize the area
of RdjSOR(p¯) in (43) for θe ∈ [0, 2pi], which is calculated as
Area
(
RdjSOR(p¯)
)
=
∫ 2pi
0
1
2
(
d¯dje (p¯, θe)
)2
dθe. (47)
A general closed-form expression of (47) is not available,
and its convexity is unknown. Hence, numerically minimizing
Area
(
RdjSOR(p¯)
)
is NP-hard. To overcome this, we propose
Algorithm 2, which iteratively finds the optimal n-th element
of p¯ while keeping the others fixed.
Algorithm 2 provides a sub-optimal solution which reduces
the complexity by degrading the original problem to one-
dimensional linear search. However, for large Nt, the complex-
ity is still huge since during each main iteration, N ∼ O(Nt)
times of linear searching are required to fully update p¯. Hence,
Algorithm 2 is not suitable for some scenarios where θb and db
change fast. In this light, we propose a simplified algorithm,
Algorithm 3, to further reduce the complexity. In Step 2 of
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Algorithm 3 Simplified directional jamming without informa-
tion of Rsus
1: Initialization: Update the information of θb and db at
Alice; Initialize Areamin = Inf.;
2: Calculate se;b(θm),m = 1, ...,M . Determine m′1,m′2, sat-
isfying that se;b(θm′
1
) ≥ se;b(θm′
2
) ≥ se;b(θm), ∀m 6= m′1
and m 6= m′2;
3: for φ = 0 to 1 do
4: Find
p¯
opt
boundary = argminArea
(
RdjSOR (p¯boundary)
)
.
5: Calculate AreadjSOR
(
p¯
opt
boundary
)
according to (47);
6: if AreadjSOR
(
p¯
opt
boundary
)
< Areamin then
7: Areamin = Area
dj
SOR
(
p¯
opt
boundary
)
;
8: φopt = φ; p¯opt = p¯optboundary.
9: else
10: continue
11: end if
12: end for
Algorithm 3, θm is the mean angle of the m-th side lobe of
RdjSOR(p¯) (m = 0 denotes the main lobe). In Step 4, p¯boundary
follows the structure such as
p¯boundary =
{
0, ..., P¯m′
1
, 0, ..., P¯m′
2
, 0, ...
}
,
P¯m′
1
+ P¯m′
2
= φPtot (48)
where m′1 and m′2 are the indices of the two dominating side
lobes, which are located most closely to the main lobe (from
both sides). The derivation of Algorithm 3 is described in
Appendix E.
With Algorithm 3, jamming is performed in only two dom-
inating directions in the neighborhood of θb, for the reasons
that 1) for the region with large angle difference to Bob,
allocating much jamming power is inefficient since RnjSOR in
this region is generally very small; 2) for the directions highly
in-line with θb, jamming should be avoided as it will cause
severe interference to Bob. Note that for every realization of
φ, only single time of linear search is required in Step 4.
The complexity is irrelative to N (which is large in general),
hence can be greatly reduced compared to Algorithm 2. As
a possible extension, more than two dominating directions
can be involved in the design while the trade-off between
complexity and performance exists.
VI. EXTENSION TO MULTIUSER AND MULTI-CELL
SCENARIOS
We focus on the single-cell and single-user scenario in
previous sections. In this section, we now show how the
SOR can be affected by multiple users and cells. We also
provide discussions on the design of secure transmission in
these scenarios with future research challenges.
A. Multiuser Transmission
When multiple legitimate users (i.e., multiple Bobs) are
presented in massive MIMO systems for Rician channels,
the multiuser interference between Bobs is trivial as long
as their LOS angles have large difference, which can be
readily ensured via user scheduling. On the contrary, the
multiuser interference to Eves can be seen as equivalent
jamming considering that single-user decoder is adopted at
Eves, which is likely to happen when Eves are low-cost
devices. Hence, when multiuser beamforming is applied for
Bobs, the received multiuser interference at Eve becomes equal
to the directional jamming, transmitted towards other Bobs’
directions. Consequently, the SOR of an objective Bob will
be shrunk in the directions of the other Bobs. Denote the set
of all legitimate users as IMUr = {b1, ..., bU}. Similar to (43)
and (44), which describe the SOR for directional jamming, the
SOR of user bu ∈ IMUr in the presence of multiple users can
now be described as
RMU,buSOR (p¯bu) =
{
(de, θe) | de ≤ d¯
MU,bu
e (p¯bu , θe)
} (49)
d¯MU,bue (p¯bu , θe) =
[(
2Rth(1− φ)P˜totNtse;bu(θe)
1 + (1− φ)P˜totd
−α
bu
Nt − 2Rth
− s¯(θe)
HVdiag(p˜bu)V
H s¯(θe)
) 1
α
]+
(50)
where V = [Wb,Vj] ∈ CNt×N spans the equivalent jamming
space, in which Wb =
[
wbu′
]
, u′ = 1, ..., U, u′ 6= u
spans the signaling space for the other legitimate users,
while Vj ∈ null (Wb) is the jamming space. Corre-
spondingly, the power allocation vector can be divided into
two parts as p˜bu =
[
p˜Tbu,sig, p˜
T
bu,jam
]T
where p˜bu,sig ,[
P˜b1 , ..., P˜bu−1 , P˜bu+1 , ..., P˜bU
]T
is the signal power alloca-
tion vector for all legitimate users except for bu. For given
fixed p˜bu,sig, in order to minimize Area
(
RMU,buSOR (p¯bu)
)
for
user bu, the directional jamming algorithms, i.e., Algorithm 2
and 3, can be directly applied herein.
Considering communication secrecy for the entire multiuser
transmission system, the optimization problem can be reason-
ably re-formulated as a min-max problem such as
min
p¯bu
max
bu
Area
(
RMU,buSOR (p¯bu)
)
s.t. ‖p¯bu‖1 < Ptot, bu ∈ I
MU
r .
(51)
The main challenge in solving (51) is that allocating power for
one user affects the SORs of other users. Hence, the power
needs to be jointly allocated for all users, and the complexity
of such joint optimization can be very high. Hence, it is
desirable to develop simplified algorithms for the multiuser
scenario.
B. Multi-cell Network
In multi-cell massive MIMO networks, it is commonly
assumed that the training pilots are reused among cells.
Correspondingly, pilot contamination results in imperfect CSI
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Fig. 2: Radius of the main lobe/side lobes of RujSOR vs. φ.
Parameters setting: θb = 0◦, db = 100m, Nt = 100, and
Rth = 10bps/Hz.
estimation as well as nonnegligible multi-cell interference
from Alices in adjacent cells. Denote θji,b as the angular
direction of Bob in Cell i seen from Alice in Cell j, and Cell
0 as the objective cell where Bob 0 exists. Some major effects
of imperfect CSI and multi-cell interference on the SOR of
Bob 0 are described as follows:
• Due to pilot contamination from Bobs i, ∀i 6= 0, the SOR
of Bob 0 will be enlarged in the directions of θ0i,b.
• Multi-cell interference to Bob 0 will isotropically enlarge
his SOR. On the other hand, Eves in Cell 0 are equiva-
lently jammed by the multi-cell interference from Alice j
in cell j, ∀j 6= 0, especially in the directions of θj0,b and
θjj,b. Thereby, the SOR in these directions can be shrunk
and the shape can be non-continuous in these regions.
A general analytical description of the SOR in the multi-
cell network is challenging, since it is determined not only by
the network topology, but also by the locations of all pilot-
contaminating users in adjacent cells. Moreover, the compli-
cated shape of the SOR makes difficulties in calculating and
minimizing the corresponding area. Nevertheless, in practice,
pilot scheduling and reuse schemes can be utilized to alleviate
these adverse effects which are caused by pilot contamination,
e.g., [34], [35].
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulation results are shown in this section. We set d0 =
0.5, α = 3, Ptot = 1W, N0 = 10
−5mW and for simplicity,
assume strong LOS environment such that Ke;b → 1. In
this parameter setting, the receive SNR is 20dB when the
transmitter-receiver distance is 100m.
At first, using (23) and (24), Fig. 2 provides a description of
RujSOR(φ) in terms of the radius of the main lobe/side lobes.
It is shown that the radius of the main lobe is monotonously
increasing with φ, indicating that reducing the signal power to-
wards θb enlarges the SOP in this direction. Clearly, allocating
additional jamming power to the direction of θb will further
enlarge this radius, which suggests that jamming directly in the
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Fig. 3: SOP vs. power allocation coefficient φ. Parameters
setting: db = 100m, θb = 0◦, De = [50m, 100m], Ae =
[−15◦, 15◦], L = 10, and Rth = 10bps/Hz.
legitimate user’s direction should be avoided. This conclusion
coincides with the concept we followed for the design of
Algorithm 3.
Moreover, as φ increases, the radius of the second side lobe
is reduced first and then increases after a certain value, e.g.,
φ ≈ 0.7, indicating an optimal jamming power allocation in
terms of minimizing the SOP in this direction. The side lobes
with index m ≥ 3 can be completely eliminated with proper
jamming. The results show that we can design jamming based
on the partial information of Rsus. For example, in Fig. 2, if
we know that Eves are located in the direction ranges of side
lobes with indices larger than 3, then, allocating φ = 0.2 is
enough to secure the communication and the remaining power
can be allocated to data transmission.
Next, we depict the SOP vs. φ in Fig. 3, with randomly
generated θe and de within the range Ae = [−15◦, 15◦] and
De = [50m, 100m], respectively. Note that the smoothless of
the curves is not due to the lack of simulation trials, but caused
by the fact that Pout is a piecewise function, as shown in (7)
and (30). In addition, the SOP rapidly increases to 1 when
φ exceeds φmax in (17). From Fig. 3, we can see that 1)
the SOP with optimal φ is much smaller than that without
jamming, i.e., φ = 0, as anticipated in Proposition 3; 2) the
SOP decreases as Nt increases since larger Nt results in higher
received power at Bob and less leakage to Eve. Moreover, the
optimal φ increases with Nt because with larger Nt, allocating
more power to data transmission is not efficient in increasing
the achievable rate of Bob because of the logarithmic slope
of the rate function; and 3) the SOP is further substantially
reduced with directional jamming.
Fig. 4 shows the optimal jamming power coefficient φopt
as a function of the normalized crosstalk se;b, for uniform
jamming. We compare the derived φopt in (39) with Monte
Carlo simulations and show a good match between them.
From Fig. 4, we first observe that each curve is divided into
two parts, respectively representing that φ0 or φoptg dominates
the optimal result in (39). The division is emphasized using
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shown for variant jamming algorithms. Parameters setting:
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a vertical dash line for the case with db = 150m. When
db = 100m, in the φ0-dominating region, the curves with
Nt = 50 and 100m coincide with each other since Nt does not
affect φ0 in (41). In the φoptg -dominating region, φopt increases
with Nt with given se;b. The region-division in Fig. 4 can be
explained as follows: in the left region, se;b is small enough
so the channels between Eves and Bob can be considered as
asymptotically orthogonal, i.e., he ∈ null(hb). In this case,
more signal power is leaked to Eve with larger se;b, hence we
need more jamming power allocated in null(hb) to degrade
Eve’s channel. However, in the φoptg -dominating region, the
value of se;b is large, which indicates that channels from Alice
to Eves and Bob could be highly aligned, i.e., he /∈ null(hb).
In this case, jamming in null(hb) is not efficient to degrade
Eve’s channel and the jamming can be a waste of transmit
power. Thus, the optimal jamming power starts decreasing
with se;b.
In Fig. 5, for the case that without information of Rsus, we
compare the area of SOR achieved by different algorithms. For
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for no jamming and uniform/directional jamming algorithms.
Parameters setting: Nt = 100, Rth = 10bps/Hz, θb = 0◦,
L = 10, Ae = [−30◦, 30◦], and De = [50m, 200m].
uniform jamming, the optimal φ is found via one dimensional
linear search by minimizing the area described in (36). For all
curves, the SOR enlarges with increasing db, since larger db
results in weaker signal power received at Bob. With uniform
jamming, the area of the SOR can be reduced approximately
by half compared with the non-jamming case. This consider-
able reduction of SOR area together with the least implemen-
tation complexity make uniform jamming still a good option
for practical system design. Using the directional jamming
with Algorithm 2, the SOR area can be further reduced, but it
induces the highest complexity among all schemes. At last, we
note that for the directional jamming, Algorithm 3 achieves
slightly larger area of SOR than Algorithm 2, where the
difference becomes smaller especially for small db. However,
the implementation complexity can be greatly reduced by
Algorithm 3, which makes it being a reasonable choice that
strikes a compromise between complexity and performance.
It can also be confirmed from Fig. 5 that even without any
information of Rsus, directional jamming can still be utilized
to enhance communication secrecy.
We depict the SOP vs. db in Fig. 6 for a particular example
scenario, where Rsus is defined by Ae = [−30◦, 30◦] and
De = [50m, 200m]. Four schemes are compared, i.e., without
jamming, uniform jamming, and directional jamming schemes
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3. Correspondingly, we also depict
the SORs achieved by each schemes in Fig. 7 to help us better
understanding the relation between the SOR and SOP. We note
that in Fig. 6, the smoothless of the curves is caused by the
area calculation of the intersection between two complicated-
shaped regions, not by the lacking of simulation trials.
As shown in Fig. 6, all jamming schemes can achieve
lower SOP compared to that without jamming. In the small-db
region, directional jamming schemes outperform uniform jam-
ming. However, the performance improvement from uniform
jamming to directional jamming Algorithm 1 is small because
Algorithm 1 directionally allocates jamming power towards
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Fig. 7: Description of the corresponding SORs for the 4
schemes in Fig. 6, when db = 150m.
Rsus to suppress the SOR side lobes (as shown in Fig. 7
(c)), whereas when Bob is close to Alice, most side lobes
are already very small with uniform jamming. Moreover, in
the small-db region, directional jamming Algorithm 3 achieves
the lowest SOP for the reason that it focuses on only two
dominating SOR side lobes (as shown in Fig. 7 (d)) hence the
jamming power can be used more efficiently in Algorithm 3
than Algorithm 1, where jamming is uniformly performed to
all directions within Rsus. In this example, the two dominating
side lobes are covered by Rsus, thereby they contribute more
in the SOP calculation compared with the other side lobes.
However, in a different scenario where Rsus does not cover
the two dominating side lobes, it cannot be concluded that
Algorithm 3 always outperforms Algorithm 1.
At last, we note that as db increases, the performance
of Algorithm 3 degrades and Algorithm 1 outperforms the
others. The reason is, when db is large, all SOR side lobes
correspondingly become large as shown in Fig. 7 (d). In this
case, besides the two dominating side lobes, the impact from
the other side lobes cannot be simply ignored as that has been
done in Algorithm 3. In conclusion, in practice, appropriate
jamming scheme should be determined according to both the
available information of Rsus and the location information of
Bob such as db.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we first define and analytically describe the
SOR for secure communication in massive MIMO Rician
channels, and derive expressions of the SOP. We then de-
termine a jamming-beneficial range, indicating that uniform
jamming is useful in reducing the SOP when the distance
from Eve to Alice is less than a threshold. Optimal jam-
ming and signal power allocation is investigated for uniform
jamming, furthermore, for both conditions with and without
the information of the suspicious area, we propose directional
jamming algorithms, which makes use of the jamming power
more efficiently and further reduce the SOP. We further extend
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Fig. 8: Description of s(x), the cross points and peak values.
the discussions to multiuser and multi-cell scenarios where
future challenges are also described. In conclusion, we claim
that uniform jamming still helps the communication secrecy
in massive MIMO systems, and the proposed directional
jamming outperforms conventional uniform jamming schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof of 1): We can rewrite si;j(θi, θj) in (6) as a function
of ∆i;j as follows
si;j(θi, θj) = Ki;js (∆i;j) . (52)
By applying [31, (14)] to ti;j in (6), s(x) in (52) can be
represented as
s (x) =
{
1, x = 0
1
N2t
sin2(Ntpidx)
sin2(pidx)
, x 6= 0
(53)
which is a sinc-like function, has one main lobe and side lobes
with decreasing amplitudes.
Proof of 2): In order to describe the CDF of si;j , we first
characterize s(x) in (53) by some cross points and peak values,
shown in Fig. 8 and defined in the following.
Definition 4: The cross points and peak values are defined
as
• Peak Values: The peak value of the m-th side lobe of
s(x) can be approximated by
PVm ≈
1
N2t
1
sin2
(
pi
m+ 1
2
Nt
) ≈ 1
pi2
(
m+ 12
)2 (54)
which is obtained by noting that sin(x) ≈ x when x is
small, and it becomes asymptotically exact as Nt is large.
PV0 = 1 corresponds to the main lobe.
• Cross Points: When u < PVM , CPm,i(u), i = 1, 2
denotes the i-th cross point between y = u and y = s(x)
in side lobe m (m < M ), CP0(u) is the cross point in
the main lobe.
Using (52), we have Fsi;j (Ki;ju) = Pr{s (∆i;j) < u}.
According to Fig. 8, Pr{s (∆i;j) < u} can be evaluated by
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calculating the probability that ∆i;j falls within the discrete
intervals determined by CPm,i(u) and CP0(u). On the other
hand, recalling that ∆i;j , | sin θi − sin θj | and θi follows
uniform distribution, the CDF of ∆i;j can be written as
F∆(z)
,
1
θmax − θmin
[
min
(
sin−1 (min (1, z + sin θj)) , θmax
)
−max
(
sin−1 (max (−1,−z + sin θj)) , θmin
) ]+
. (55)
Using F∆(z) to describe the probability that ∆i;j falls within
the described intervals leads to (7).
Proof of 3): Given θj , the feasible range of ∆i;j is deter-
mined by Ai, i.e., the angle range that node i distributed in.
Use XAi to denote this feasible range (shown in Fig. 8), it
holds that XAi ⊂ [0, 1]. Given Ai, the feasible range of si;j
can be determined as [0,Ki;jβ∗Ai ], where β
∗
Ai
, max
x∈XAi
s(x).
It is clear that β∗Ai ≤ 1, leading us to the conclusion.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
For the ease of description, we first define
h (x) ,
xNt2
Rth
1 + xd−αb Nt − 2
Rth
. (56)
Letting t = z
α+P˜jam
a1+P˜jam
where a1 = h(P˜b), and t0 = z
α
a2
where
a2 = h(P˜tot), we rewrite (30) as
Pout = 1−
{∫ dmax
dmin
Fse;b (t)×
2z
d2max − d
2
min
dz
}L
. (57)
Since Fse;b(·) is an increasing function, Pout decreases with
t in the domain of Fse;b (·). Therefore, if the following condi-
tions are satisfied, we can conclude that jamming is beneficial.
1) There exists a positive value of P˜jam, which holds t −
t0 > 0 for any z ∈ De; and
2) z ∈ De such that t0 < smaxe;b
where condition 1) defines the scenario, in which jamming
can always result in a larger t than t0 (corresponding to the
no-jamming case), thereby leading to lower Pout since it is
a decreasing function in t. Moreover, condition 2) ensures
that t0 is less than the maximum feasible value of se;b,
otherwise, Pout is always zero either with or without jamming
under condition 1), hence the benefits of jamming cannot be
concluded. For 1), it is equivalent to prove that
zα + P˜jam
a1 + P˜jam
>
zα
a2
(58)
has a positive solution of P˜jam. Note that with proper param-
eter setting that φ is no larger than φmax described in (17),
we have a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, and note that if
dαmax < a2 (59)
then zα < a2 holds for any z. In this case, (58) can be
equivalently rewritten as
P˜jam >
(a1 − a2)zα
a2 − zα
. (60)
Noting that dh(x)dx < 0, it is clear from (60) that P˜jam > 0,
thus (59) is a sufficient condition to satisfy 1). On the other
hand, as t0 ≤ d
α
max
a2
, a sufficient condition that satisfies 2) is
dαmax < s
max
e;b a2. (61)
Here, according to Lemma 1, we have smaxe;b ≤ 1. Hence, the
intersection of (59) and (61) is equal to (61), and recalling the
definition of a2 leads to the final result.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
First, from (52), (53), se;b(θe) in the m-th side lobe can be
presented as
se;b(θe) =
Ke;b
N2t
sin2 (Ntpidx)
sin2 (pidx)
, x ∈
[
m
Ntd
,
m+ 1
Ntd
]
. (62)
In (62), sine functions appear in both the numerator and
denominator, making it infeasible to obtain closed-form results
in further analysis. Hence, we find an upper bound of (62) by
fixing the value of x to the left end point of its domain, i.e.,
x = m
Ntd
, in the denominator.
se;b(θe) ≤
Ke;b
pi2m2
sin2 (Ntpidx) . (63)
For the ease of description, we consider only the condition
that θe > 0. With θb = 0, we can rewrite x (defined as x =
| sin θe − sin θb|) in terms of θe as
x = sin θe ≤ θe. (64)
Note that the side lobes that are close to the main lobe are more
important in contributing to the area of the SOR, as a result, the
value of θe that should be concerned is very small. Therefore,
the upper bound in (64) can be very tight. Combining (63)
and (64) we have
se;b(θe) ≤
Ke;b
pi2m2
sin2 (Ntpidθe) . (65)
Substitute (65) into (19), and calculate the area by integral,
we get
Area
(
RujSOR,m
)
=
∫
θe∈Am
1
2
(C1(φ)se;b(θe)− C2(φ)) dθe (66)
≤
∫
θe∈Am
1
2
(
C1(φ)
Ke;b
pi2m2
sin2 (Ntpidθe)− C2(φ)
)
dθe
(67)
=
1
Ntpid
∫ (m+1)pi
mpi
1
2
(
C1(φ)
Ke;b
pi2m2
sin2 (η)− C2(φ)
)
dη
(68)
=
1
4Ntd
(
Ke;b
pi2m2
C1(φ) − 2C2(φ)
)
(69)
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where Am = [ mNtd ,
m+1
Ntd
] is the physical angle range of the
m-th side lobe. To obtain (66), we use α = 2, and (67) is
obtained using (65). From (67) to (68), we use the variable
substitution η = Ntpidθe, then (69) is obtained by simple
integral calculation of elementary functions.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
When θel = θe, ∀l = 1, ..., L, Pout in (30) is determined
only by de such that
Pout = 1−
(∫ dmax
max[d0(φ,θe),dmin]
2z
d2max − d
2
min
dz
)L
(70)
where
d0(φ, θe) =
[{
h
(
(1− φ)P˜tot
)
+ φP˜tot
}
se;b(θe)− φP˜tot
] 1
α
, [g(φ)]
1
α (71)
is the distance threshold. Given θe, any Eve with a distance
to Alice smaller than d0(φ, θe) can cause secrecy outage.
Noting this, (70) calculates the overall outage probability
by assuming that de follows uniform distribution. Clearly, if
min
φ
d0(φ, θe) < dmin, the integral range in (70) becomes
[dmin, dmax] hence a zero SOP can be achieved; otherwise
if min
φ
d0(φ, θe) > dmax, a definite outage occurs with proba-
bility 1.5 Rewrite g(φ) in (71) as
g(φ) , se;b(θe)g1(φ) + (1− se;b(θe))g2(φ) (72)
where g1(φ) , h((1 − φ)P˜tot), g2(φ) , −φP˜tot and h(·)
is defined in (56). Clearly, minimizing (70) is equivalent to
minimizing (72). Since g1(φ) is concave and g2(φ) is linear,
g(φ) is concave. Hence, letting ∂g(φ)
∂φ
= 0, the optimal φ
satisfying φ < φmax (as in (17)) is given by φoptg in (40).
Note that if d0(φoptg , θe) < dmin, setting φopt = φoptg is
not the only choice since the solution of d0(φ, θe) = dmin (if
exists), denoted as φ0, also achieves zero SOP. Therefore, we
need to check the value of φ0 and compare it with φoptg to
determine the final optimal jamming power allocation. Note
that in (72), the value of g1(φ) is usually much less than
g2(φ). Hence, when se;b(θe) is not so large, g(φ) can be well
approximated by a linear function as g(φ) ≈ se;b(θe)h(P˜tot)−
(1 − se;b(θe))P˜totφ. Using this approximation, we get φ0 =
se;b(θe)h(P˜tot)−d
α
min
(1−se;b(θe))P˜tot
.
If φ0 /∈ [0, 1], it is not a feasible solution in practice. If
φ0 ∈ [0, 1], both φ0 and φoptg are able to achieve zero SOP. In
this case, we choose the smaller one between φoptg and φ0 to
save jamming power such that φopt = min{φoptg , φ0}.
APPENDIX E
DERIVATION OF ALGORITHM 3
Algorithm 3 is proposed based on the following assumptions
and approximations:
5To facilitate the analysis, we assume the definite outage will not happen
by letting dmax to be large enough such that dmax > max
θe
min
φ
d0(φ, θe).
1) Assuming that the angle ranges occupied by every side
lobe (and the main lobe) of RdjSOR(p¯) are approximately
the same (which is pi
M+1 assuming that there are in total
one main lobe and M side lobes within the angle range[
pi
2 ,
pi
2
]), an upper bound of the integral in (47) can be
approximated by
AreaUB
(
RdjSOR(p¯)
)
≈
pi
2(M + 1)
M∑
m=0
(
d¯dje (p¯, θm)
)2
(73)
where the area of every side lobe is upper bounded by
the area of its enclosing sector.
2) We assume that s¯(θm)Hvm = 1 and s¯(θn)Hvm =
0, ∀n 6= m. In practice, by defining vm = s¯(θm)||s¯(θm)|| ,
this assumption is easy to realize with large Nt, where
asymptotic orthogonality holds. Now, according to (44),
d¯dje (p¯, θm) in (73) can be written as
d¯dje (p¯, θm) =
[(
am − P˜m
) 1
α
]+
(74)
where am = (1−φ)P˜totNt2
Rthse;b(θm)
1+(1−φ)P˜totd
−α
b
Nt−2Rth
and P˜m = P¯mN0
is the m-th element of p˜, with P¯m being the jamming
power allocated on the m-th side lobe.
From (73) and (74), and given fixed φ, we rewrite the original
area minimization problem as
min
M∑
m=1
(
am − P˜m
) 2
α (75)
s.t.
M∑
m=0
P¯m = φPtot, 0 ≤ P˜m ≤ am. (76)
By checking the Hessian matrix, it is easy to show that the
objective function in (75) is concave. To minimize a concave
function, clearly, the optimal solution can be found only
on the boundaries of the domain defined by (76). Recalling
that the area of the side lobes decreases rapidly with larger
lobe index, and being aware that jamming should be avoided
within the main lobe to prevent degrading Bob’s channel, we
further simplify the problem by checking the boundary of the
domain as described in (48). According to these discussions,
Algorithm 3 is obtained.
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